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Introduction
The subject of analysis in this text is information and anti-terrorist 
security of Poland, which has been approached within the context of 
a clash of two spheres – the state and the private one. On the one hand, 
the issues of information security and anti-terrorist security interpene-
trate (e.g. as far as the use of proper means of operational control is con-
cerned); on the other hand, both cases are associated with the unsolved 
problem of the state interference in the private sphere. The issues of 
security, concerned with the two material scopes indicated in the title 
have been supplemented and enhanced with the example of the tasks 
and activity of the Internal Security Agency (Pol. Agencja Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego – ABW).
The information security can be analysed within the context of the 
expansion of the state sphere, that is the powers vested in the state to 
acquire and retain information on the citizen. The aforesaid context of 
special state powers is of importance given the clash between the “state 
sphere” and the “private sphere” concerned with human rights. The 
discourse on human rights often addresses the issue of state authori-
ties invoking a  threat to security, the consequence being the legitimi-
zation of the use of ever more advanced methods and techniques for 
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acquiring information on citizens’ private lives. The issues of informa-
tion security in this text will be narrowed down to the ones concerned 
with the powers of special services to apply special means of operational 
control.
An example of the attempt at resolving the clash of the „state sphere” 
with the „private sphere” is Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). However, it must be 
stressed that the Convention is a  “protection mechanism” to be used 
in the event of the private sphere being encroached upon by the state 
sphere, which is illustrated with the settlements by international institu-
tions as regards individuals suspected of terrorist activity.
Within the context of the operation of liberal democratic states, 
a  capability to engage appropriate means to fight acts of terrorism 
remains an open question. The state is faced with the necessity to be 
effective, but at times the effectiveness is unattainable by means of legal 
instruments that are at the disposal of a  democratic state of law. In 
order not to show its powerlessness and to fulfil its functions, the state 
engages non-standard means either by breaking the law or by creating 
new powers with the aid of lex specialis.
In order to elaborate the research problem, the text poses the follow-
ing research questions: (1) To what degree does invoking a threat to security 
influence restrictions on rights and freedoms in Poland (with regard to the clash 
of the state and the private sphere)?, (2) To what degree do the tasks and activ-
ity of the Internal Security Agency influence the effectiveness of anti-terrorist 
security in Poland?
In the analysis of the indicated issues an application of a  specified 
theoretical-methodological framework will play an important role. As for 
the clash of the state and the private sphere, it will be useful and neces-
sary to invoke the concept of derivative legal modalities, that is legally 
protected powers, competence and freedoms, which can be pointed to 
in the relation between state authorities and citizens. As regards the 
analysis of the regulations concerned with “terrorist offences,” changes 
to the tasks vested in the Internal Security Agency, and directly and/or 
indirectly concerned with information and anti-terrorist security, a tele-
ological and functional interpretation of individual legal solutions will 
be conducted.
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The state and the private sphere 
It is worth referring to basic legal terms concerned with derivative 
modalities in law. In this particular case attention will be focused on 
legally protected powers, competence and freedoms. A special kind of 
power is legally protected freedom, that is a situation in which one entity 
is forbidden to interfere in another’s sphere of conduct. On the one 
hand, there is the freedom of action, and on the other hand there is the 
prohibition of interference. Besides, within the compass of derivative 
modalities, the term of competence is of vital importance; in effect, it 
can be understood as an authorization granted to one entity to per-
form a legally specified conventional act1. The issues of legally protected 
freedoms come to the fore especially in the relations between the state 
and the private sphere.
An example of the clash between the two spheres is a problem of 
“justice” within the legalist meaning. In order to fulfil its basic functions 
– and the function of security for that matter – the state must be effec-
tive; still, in the case of individuals engaging in acts of terrorism states 
happen to resort to means beyond or around the bounds of the available 
powers and competence of the authorities in a democratic state of law, or 
the legislator lays down lex specialis that is supposed to legitimise the use 
of special instruments. Such activity can not only be connected with the 
above-mentioned “terrorism,” but also with crime directed against state 
and information security. Hence, these two cases are not only similar, 
but their material scopes may become interlaced, e.g. in the context of 
“cyberterrorism,” “cyberespionage” or the use of non-standard means of 
operational control when dealing with individuals suspected of terrorism, 
or terrorists.
The examples of the violation of the private sphere on account of the 
necessity, incumbent upon the state, for fulfilling the function of security 
include, inter alia: (1) a programme of surveillance of citizens with the 
aid of ICT means, which were pointed to by E.J. Snowden, (2) detention 
of individuals suspected of terrorism in Guantanamo by the US, (3) the 
Military Commission Act implemented by the US in 2006 (amended in 
2009), (4) the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” with regard to 
1 S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, Poznań 1997, pp. 100–121; M. Szy-
dło, Wolność prawnie chroniona jako modalność prawna, [in:] J. Supernat (ed.), Między 
tradycją a  przyszłością w  nauce prawa administracyjnego. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana 
Profesorowi Janowi Bociowi, Wrocław 2009, pp. 729–740. 
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individuals suspected of terrorism and detained by US forces, (5) relo-
cation of detainees to various states, inter alia, to Poland and Romania 
by US authorities2. Furthermore, apart from these prominent examples, 
one could point to any kind of operational control (in particular the use 
of ICT means), apprehensions, detentions, searches of premises due to 
some nondescript threat to state security3.
Given the title of the text it is worth paying attention to two issues, 
that is the information security and the anti-terrorist security from the 
perspective of the encroachment of the private sphere by the state sphere. 
To illustrate these issues one might use the determinations reached by 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). In the former case in 2011 the Polish Ombudsman 
submitted two motions to the Constitutional Tribunal; the first one was 
concerned with the use by particular services, and while acting within 
operational control, of technical means enabling a secret acquisition and 
recording of information and proof; the second one was concerned with 
particular services’ access to telecommunications data.4 In the latter 
2 OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation, 
and Detention, December 2004, Central Intelligence Agency, http://cryptome.org/2013/09/
cia-interrogation-guide.pdf, 01.07.2015; Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the Risk of 
Criminality, Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First 2007; A. Szpak, 
Status prawny zatrzymanych w Guantanamo Bay, Toruń 2007; Tortured Justice: Using Coer-
ced Evidence to Prosecute Terrorist Suspects, Human Rights First 2008; Committee Study of 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (2012/2014), Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, http://graphics.wsj.com/CIA-report-interrogation-
detention/#full-document, 01.07.2015. 
3 R. Rosicki, The protection of internal security and constitutional order as exemplified by the 
tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency – a  critical analysis of de lege lata and de 
lege ferenda regulations, “Przegląd Politologiczny” 2014, No. 3, pp. 107–118; R. Rosicki, 
Information Security as Exemplified by Clandestine Collaboration and Influence Exerted by 
the Polish Internal Security Agency Officers on Journalists – de lege lata and de lege ferenda 
regulations, “Przegląd Strategiczny” 2014, No. 7, pp. 145–154; R. Rosicki, Surveillance 
and data retention in Poland, “Public Policy and Economic Development” 2014, No. 2, 
pp. 63–75.
4 R. Rosicki, Surveillance…, pp. 63–75; Wniosek RPO do TK w  sprawie stosowania przez 
poszczególne służby w ramach kontroli operacyjnej środków technicznych umożliwiających uzy-
skiwanie w  sposób niejawny informacji i dowodów oraz ich utrwalanie – 29 czerwca 2011 r., 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Wniosek_do_TK_ ws_stosowania_przez_slu-
zby_srodkow_technicznych_umozliwiajacych_uzyskiwanie_informacji_w_sposob_nie-
jawny.pdf, 24.10.2015; Wniosek RPO do TK w  sprawie dostępu poszczególnych służb do 
danych telekomunikacyjnych – 1 sierpnia 2011 r., https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/
files/Wniosek_do_TK_ws_ dostepu_sluzb_do_danych_telekomunikacyjnych.pdf, 
24.10.2015.
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case, the cases lost by Poland at the European Court of Human Rights 
in 2014 might serve here as examples.
As for the issue of information security, that is the problem of the 
use of a  special kind of operational control by services, including the 
Internal Security Agency, the Constitutional Tribunal took three years to 
adjudicate. In 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union declared 
the Data Retention Directive (on telecommunications data retention) 
null and void. The European Court determined, inter alia, that preven-
tive storage of data on all telecommunications connections, and making 
them available to law enforcement agencies outside the court’s control 
is a disproportionate infringement of civil rights and freedoms5.
On 30 July 2014 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Pol. Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny – TK) collectively referred to the above-mentioned motions 
from the Polish Ombudsman and other state administration bodies 
(seven joint motions), in specific scopes declaring unlawful the rules of 
access to telecommunications data, technical means that can be applied 
under operational control and protection of professional secrecy. The 
Constitutional Tribunal found the powers vested in the services to use 
telecommunications data in infringement of the constitutional right to 
privacy, given the fact that they do not provide for independent control 
of data sharing. As regards the underspecified technical means used in 
operational control, the Tribunal pointed out that the competent body 
ordering operational control is to specify the kind of technical means 
within the compass of statutory capabilities and adequate for a specific 
case. This issue, rules the Tribunal, should be elaborated, which is to be 
understood that there is no need to create a comprehensive and exhaus-
tive list of technical means for operational control; the law should rather 
define the kind of means that can be utilized in individually specified 
cases6. This matter is of great significance given press coverage, as well 
as comments from human rights organizations on the abuse of data 
acquisition procedures based on technical means of operational control7.
5 Trybunał Sprawiedliwości orzekł, że dyrektywa w sprawie zatrzymywania danych jest nieważna 
[Komunikat Prasowy nr 54/14], http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2014-04/cp140054pl.pdf, 01.07.2015; Wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europej-
skiej z dnia 8 kwietnia 2014 r. w  sprawach połączonych C293/12 i C594/12, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid =150642&doclang=EN, 01.07.2014.
6 Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 30 lipca 2014 r. Sygn. akt K 23/11, http://isap.
sejm.gov.pl/Details Servlet?id=WDU20140001055, 24.10.2015.
7 R. Rosicki, Panoptykon – władza, wiedza i  informacja, „Przegląd Naukowo-Metodyczny. 
Edukacja dla Bezpieczeństwa” 2013, No. 4, pp. 77–94.
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The issue of information security and of the state securing extensive 
capabilities with regard to operational control and data retention is fre-
quently justified as a necessity to be effective in combating organized 
crime and “terrorist offences.” However, the Polish mass media high-
lighted the possible as well as effective use of special means in politi-
cal competition, e.g. in the operation of the overly politicised Internal 
Security Agency. 
As regards the issue of anti-terrorist security, it is worth paying 
attention to two plaints – Plaint No. 7511/13 (concerned with Husayn/
Abu Zubaydah) and Plaint No. 28761/11 (concerned with Al Nashiri) – 
lodged at the European Court of Human Rights against Poland, which 
lost both cases at the European Court. A lack of sufficient collaboration 
with Poland was demonstrated during the proceedings. The ECtHR rul-
ing results in the determination that Poland participated in the violation 
of human rights with regard to the unlawful detention of foreign citizens 
and the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA)8.
“Terrorism” and “terrorist offences”
In the discourse on terrorism an interpenetration of at least two 
issues becomes a problem, that is the analyses of “terrorism” as a social 
phenomenon or/and methods of operation, as well as the analyses of 
“terrorism” as phenomena interpreted with regard to the context or/and 
criminal acts. Another problem is posed by the systematisation of the 
issue effected by creating classifications and typologies, the latter being 
more common, for they are but a partial approach, and as such do not 
require of the presenter much intellectual effort, so indispensable in the 
systematic division of social phenomena.
An act of terrorism can be characterised by the goal that the persons 
engaging in it want to achieve, which is a frequent element in the defin-
iens of the term “terrorism”. By way of illustration, R. Schultz stresses 
the significance of political aims that can be achieved by means of terror-
ist acts. By the same token, “terrorism” is defined by W. Dietl, K. Hir-
schmann and R. Tophoven, who refer to the aim of political influence, 
8 Case of Al Nashiri v. Poland (Application No. 28761/11), Judgment Strasbourg 24 July 
2014; Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (Application No. 7511/13), Judgment 
Strasbourg 24 July 2014.
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while T. P. Thornton points to the arousal of political activity, winning 
support, as well as staging political provocation9.
More often than not, social analyses (within the framework of politi-
cal, social and cultural studies) point to “terrorism” as a means of attain-
ing ideological objectives encompassing mainly political and religious 
aspects10. To simplify matters, one might say that terrorist attacks will 
be a form of political activity, while anything can be deemed “political”11. 
Given these approaches, this phenomenon will take on special features – 
the ones that make it possible to distinguish “terrorism” from individual 
and similar or completely different phenomena. In these approaches the 
very fact of replication of terrorist acts is not identical with the phenom-
enon of terrorism12. Hence, the views on the phenomenon of terrorism, 
and by extension on the analyses concerned with this phenomenon, 
must be connected with a  variety of epistemic currents, e.g. (1) the 
positivist, (2) the constructivist, and (3) the constructionist one. The 
approaches within the scope of cognition of a  given phenomenon will 
be either deliberately ideologised or merely interpreted, knowingly or 
not. International and religiously motivated terrorism may serve here 
as an example of ideologisation or interpretation. The rationale behind 
its interpretation may be something that Immanuel Wallerstein termed 
“European universalism,” that is the system of the Western world prac-
tices and values predominating in the international arena13. The very fact 
of using the term “terrorism” in the public and/or academic discourse 
is tantamount to an appraisal of a sort, i.e. negative judgmentalism to 
all intents and purposes14. Passing judgments in relation to some more 
profound premises, but also to the superficiality of analyses may give 
9 T.P. Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, [in:] H. Eckstein (ed.), Internal 
War. Problems and Approaches, London 1964, p. 73; R. Schultz, Conceptualizing political 
terrorism: A typology, “Journal of International Affairs” 1978, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 7–15; 
R.E. Hall, A Note on September Eleventh: the Arabization of terrorism, “The Social Science 
Journal” 2003, Vol. 40, pp. 459–464; S.H. Başeren, Terrorism with Its Differentiating 
Aspects, “Defence Against Terrorism Review” 2008, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 2–5; W. Dietl, 
K.  Hirschmann, R. Tophoven, Terroryzm, Warszawa 2009, pp. 27–29. 
10 Cf. T. Hanausek, W  sprawie pojęcia współczesnego terroru, „Problemy Kryminalistyki” 
1980, No 143, pp. 30–31.
11 Cf. A. Pawłowski, Terroryzm w Europie XIX i XX wieku, Zielona Góra 1984, p. 24.
12 J. Muszyński, Istota terroryzmu politycznego, [in:] J. Muszyński (ed.), Terroryzm polityczny, 
Warszawa 1981, p. 19.
13 I. Wallerstein, European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power, London, New York 2006, 
p. 1 onwards. 
14 B.M. Jenkins, The study of terrorism: definitional problems, Santa Monica 1980, p. 1.
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rise to “one-dimensional” approaches to the phenomenon of terrorism, 
which in turn might result in their meagre empirical value15.
Less axiological objectives of terrorist acts include that which is related 
to the etymological origin of the term “terrorism” (Latin terrere ‘fill with 
fear, frighten’) – fear and fright. This element is indispensable to defin-
ing both the phenomenon of terrorism and methods used by terrorists. 
Still, in order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, one should be able 
to effectively apply violence and force. Hence, it should be pointed out 
that violence, fear and fright play a decidedly predominant role both in 
the definiens of the term “terrorism” and among the objectives of terrorist 
acts. The attempts at defining the phenomenon of terrorism made by 
P. Wilkinson serve here as an example of such approaches; he remarked 
that the determinant of the phenomenon is fear attained through the 
medium of violence, the recipient being a  group of individuals larger 
than the direct target group that the attack is directed at16.
Emphasising fear and fright in the analysis of the term ‘terrorism’ 
is of some importance with regard to the legal definition of “terrorist 
offences,” which was introduced by the Polish legislator to Art. 115 § 20 
of the Penal Code. “A terrorist offence is a prohibited act… committed 
with the aim of: 1) seriously terrorising a  large number of people, 2) forcing 
a public authority of the Republic of Poland, or another state or international 
organisation, to take or not to take a certain course of action, 3) cause a serious 
disturbance in the political system or the economy of the Republic of Poland, or 
another state or international organisation, – or a threat to commit such an act. 
Another reason for recognizing a  terrorist offence is a  proper penalty 
range, that is the upper limit of imprisonment period of at least 5 years17. 
The result of such a definition of an offence, that is the realisation of the 
subjective aspect and the inclusion of the guidelines as to the sanctions, is 
that any conduct corresponding to any type of offence within the compass 
of the Polish penal and substantive regulations can thus be of a terrorist 
15 Cf. K. Jałoszyński, Współczesny wymiar antyterroryzmu, Warszawa 2008, pp. 32–61; 
A. Wejkszner, The post-9/11 Al Qaida. The Vanguard of Islamic Terrorism at the Onset of 
the 21st Century, [in:] S. Wojciechowski (ed.), The modern terrorism and its forms, Poznań 
2007, pp. 109–118.
16 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The liberal state response, London, New York 
2006, pp. 1–3, 15–16; B. Çınar, The Relationship Between Terrorism and Liberal Democratic 
States, “European Journal of Economic and Political Studies” 2010, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 
207–221.
17 Ustawa Kodeks karny z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 88, item 553, 
as amended).
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nature18. Hence, these offences will constitute varied interests protected 
by law, offences against state security and public security carrying the 
same weight as offences against sexual freedom and decency. The conse-
quence of this will be, for instance, categorising the offence of rape (while 
“blackmailing” the state authorities with the following: “if you don’t revise 
your decision, I am going to rape this person”) as a terrorist offence.
The regulation concerned with the legal definition of “terrorist 
offences” was introduced because of the necessity to implement the 
Council Framework Decision of 2002 on combating terrorism19. The 
objective of the decision was to approximate the penalization of terrorist 
acts in the EU Member States. The decision was based on the following 
elements: (1) an objective one (pointing to a specific prohibited act) and 
(2) a subjective one (pointing to the subjective aspect, that is the goals 
supposedly actuating the perpetrator of a  prohibited act). Because of 
the EU regulations, the Polish legislator’s aim was a proper penal policy 
on combating terrorism due to a heightened threat of terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, given the special kind of evaluation of acts, the legislator 
recognized that terrorist offences should be subject to more severe crimi-
nal sanctions (like in the case of habitual offenders). Attention should 
also be paid to the function of the new regulations, that is the intention 
to consolidate the issues concerned with the phenomenon of terrorism 
within the system of penal regulations.
The tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency
The legislator defines the material scope of the tasks of the Internal 
Security Agency in Art. 5 para 1–2 of the Act on the Internal Security 
Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency.20 These tasks, contained in a cata-
18 R. Zgorzały, Przestępstwo o charakterze terrorystycznym w polskim prawie karnym, „Proku-
ratura i Prawo” 2007, No. 7–8, pp. 58–79.
19 Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Official 
Journal of the European Communities L 164/3–7; Report from the Commission based 
on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism 
{SEC(2007) 1463} (2007), Brussels, 6.11.2007 COM(2007) 681 final. 
20 Ustawa o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu z  dnia 24 maja 
2002  r. (Journal of Laws 2002, No 74, item 676, as amended); M. Karpiuk, Zakres 
działania służb specjalnych, [in:] M. Bożek, M. Czuryk, M. Karpiuk, J. Kostrubiec (eds.), 
Służby specjalne w  strukturze władz publicznych. Zagadnienia prawnoustrojowe, Warszawa 
2014, pp. 92–94.
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logue, are listed enumerative in the Act, offences against the state coming 
to the fore:
(1) Identifying, preventing, and eliminating threats to the state’s internal 
security and its constitutional order, and in particular, its sovereignty 
and international position, independence and inviolability of its ter-
ritory, as well as the state’s protection.
(2) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes of espionage, terrorism, 
infringement of the state’s secret, as well as other criminal offences 
threatening the state’s security.
(3) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes threatening the state’s 
economic security.
(4) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes of corruption among 
public officials, should such crimes endanger the state’s security.
(5) Identifying, preventing, and detecting criminal offences regarding the 
production of and trade in commodities, technologies, and services 
of strategic importance for the state’s security.
(6) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes of illegal production, 
possession, and trade in weapons, ammunition, explosives, and weap-
ons of mass destruction, as well as narcotic and psychotropic sub-
stances in international circulation, and prosecuting the perpetrators.
(7) Protecting classified information and exercising the state’s security 
powers regarding the protection of classified information in interna-
tional relations.
(8) Acquiring, analysing, processing, and providing competent authori-
ties with the information essential for the protection of the state’s 
internal security and for its constitutional order.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that any extra tasks of the Internal 
Security Agency (ABW) may follow from other acts of internal law or 
international agreements. An example of the fulfilment of Poland’s obli-
gations towards the European Union is referring in the Act on the Internal 
Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency to the Head of the ABW 
as the point of contact as regards the exchange of information instru-
mental in preventing terrorist offences (Art. 5 para 3; Art. 16 para 3 of 
2008/615/JHA)21.
The legislator’s aim was to specify the operation of the central agency 
of government administration. The above-described scope of activity 
21 Council Decision (2008/615/JHA) of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border coope-
ration, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (2008), Official Journal of 
the European Union L 210/1-11.
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determines the actions to be undertaken, but also the possibility of 
using operational control means, for they condition their acquisition. 
Hence, the generality of the legal phrasing in the said article of the Act 
became an object of criticism. An attempt was made at resolving this 
issue – a  series of bills were put forth; this time the two special serv-
ices – the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency 
(Pol. Agencja Wywiadu – AW) – were handled separately. Despite the 
fact that the legal appraisal of Document No. 2295, ordered by the Sejm 
Bureau of Research, is positive about the “new version” of the Bill, it 
would be far-fetched to claim that the legislator removed all the doubts 
concerning the scope of the ABW’s operation22. Apart from the quality 
of legislation, the biggest problem was the scope of the application of 
operational control in the Bill of 2013 and in the Bill of 2014 (the content 
not included in Document No. 2295)23. The reason for ordering the legal 
appraisal was, among others, the formerly unidentified “counter-intelli-
gence prevention” (Art. 3 para 1 section 3 of the Bills of 2013 and 2014), 
which in effect caused the ABW to have an unlimited capacity for using 
this legal instrument24. Document No. 2295 limits the operational control 
to identifying, preventing, and detecting specified offences (Art. 3 para 1 
section 2). Moreover, during the legislative process major shortcomings, 
which had featured in the 2013 Bill, were removed; these were concerned 
with, inter alia, the introduction of a division of offences into extremist 
and terrorist ones, which had no relevance for the Polish criminal law 
system, and was out of keeping with the art of making acts of law. It 
must be noted that the 2013 Bill presented by the Ministry of Interior, 
headed by B. Sienkiewicz, aroused the greatest number of doubts as 
regards both solutions and the art of legislative drafting.
22 M. Chmaj, Opinia prawna w przedmiocie zgodności z Konstytucją RP rządowych projektów 
ustaw: o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (druk nr 2295) i o Agencji Wywiadu (druk nr 
2294), ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem propozycji dotyczących rozwiązań prawnych stosowanych 
wobec cudzoziemców (22.08.2014). Opinia zlecona, Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, Warszawa 
2014, pp. 1–4, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/RexDomk7.nsf/0/4C70BBB4BD91E988C1257D-
200027158C/$file/i1795-14A.rtf, 24.10.2015; Rządowy Projekt Ustawy – o Agencji Bez-
pieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Druk No 2295) (2014), Warszawa 2014, http://orka.sejm.gov.
pl/Druki7ka.nsf/0/2E17AEC9CBA410F5C1257CB7002C9305/$File/ 2295%20cz.%201.
pdf, 24.10.2015.
23 Projekt Ustawy o Agencji bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego przedstawiony do konsultacji w 2013 
r.; Projekt Ustawy o Agencji bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego z projektami aktów wykonawczych 
przedstawiony przez Prezesa Rady Ministrów Sejmowi w 2014 r.
24 R. Rosicki, The protection…, pp. 107–118. 
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In the text it was noted that the doubts concerning the relation 
between Art. 3 and Art. 21 of the 2014 Bill (Document No. 2295) were 
not removed. This assumption follows from the appraisal of the practices 
of special services, which – in the use of operational control concerning 
identification and prevention of crime – can easily use the argument of 
“organized crime” while applying for technical means. Also, from the 
standpoint of human rights, placing the operational control used against 
individuals who are not Polish citizens outside the control of the court 
and prosecution raises serious questions. Still, it is interesting to note 
that this instrument will be effective in, inter alia, the identification of 
a terrorist threat to Poland.
It should also be pointed out that the scope of tasks presented in 
the Bill on ABW of 2014 did not really limit the agency’s responsibili-
ties. This sort of solutions should be deemed disputable on account of 
a likelihood of a threat to effective prosecution of crime against the state 
and “terrorist offences”. This places the Internal Security Agency within 
the domain of “criminal intelligence,” which – given the operation of the 
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Pol. Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne – 
CBA) and the Police’s Central Bureau of Investigation (Pol. Centralne 
Biuro Śledcze Policji – CBŚ) in Poland – seems rather non-functional and 
pointless.
An appraisal of a  terrorist threat to Poland
In its annual reports the Internal Security Agency itself points out 
that the possibility of terrorist attacks in Poland is remote, even though 
it is not impossible25. One should not however welcome this stance, and 
yet because of the “marginal position” of Poland, as well as such factors 
as the homogeneity of the society and the not-too-friendly welfare policy 
(towards immigrants too), we can speak about Poland’s “natural anti-
terrorist mechanism”26. The ABW points out that the possible terrorist 
threats may be connected with Poland being treated as a substitute des-
25 Raport z  działalności Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w  2013 r., ABW, Warszawa 
2014, p. 17; Raport z działalności Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w 2014 r., ABW, 
Warszawa 2015, p. 16.
26 Cf. J. Noch, Nawet uchodźcy nie chcą mieszkać w Polsce. ”Płaczą, gdy dowiadują się, że to 
nie Niemcy. Polska da im bilet powrotny”, http://natemat.pl/138969,nawet-uchodzcy-nie-
chca-mieszkac-w-polsce-placza-gdy-dowiaduja-sie-ze-to-nie-niemcy-polska-da-im-bilet-
powrotny, 22.07.2015. 
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tination27. Poland may thus become a “transit” area for terrorists due to 
its weaker protection of the eastern border and less control of individu-
als coming from high-risk countries (individuals connected with “radical 
Islam” from the area of Africa, the Middle East, North Caucasus). By 
way of illustration, in June 2015 a Moroccan citizen travelling via Serbia 
and Poland to Spain was apprehended. He was suspected of terrorism, 
and was arrested at a Polish airport under a European Arrest Warrant 
issued by a Spanish court.
Besides, the ABW points out that the escalation of conflicts on the 
territories of Syria and Iraq may give rise to a radicalisation of individuals 
who returned from those areas28. Apart from the ABW analyses it must 
be noted that the area from which one should expect a  threat related 
to the migration of representatives of “radical Islam” are the countries 
of the former Yugoslavia. Another threat is posed by the non-standard 
instruments of conflict escalation used by Russia on the territory of 
Ukraine. An example of such an instrument is something that might 
be termed “irelandisation” of the conflict; it is effected through Rus-
sia’s support for terrorist attacks all over Ukraine, and not only through 
a military support for its eastern parts, which is happening these days.
It is worthwhile paying attention to the nature of terrorist attacks, 
which has already been synthetically presented in the text. The essence 
of terrorism is supposed to be fear, fright and violence, or – as a mat-
ter of fact – the attainment of the former two by means of the latter. 
While analysing terrorist attacks, one should include one more element, 
the one infrequently referred to, namely the fact that the goal of the 
attacks is to demonstrate the organizational helplessness of the state 
under attack. Interestingly, another factor showing a  state’s organiza-
tional powerlessness regarding anti-terrorist security can be found in 
one of the last scenes of the dark comedy Four Lions directed by Chris 
Morris. One of the film characters, a bomber named Omar, is unable 
to mount a  spectacular suicide attack. Instead he causes an explosion 
at a drugstore29. The conclusions that one might draw from this scene 
can be encapsulated in the statement that no country is ready to handle 
dispersed terrorist attacks of non-strategic goals, let alone Poland.
27 Raport…, ABW, Warszawa 2015, p. 16.
28 Ibidem,  p.  16;  Straż  Obrony  Osobistej.  Polska  granica  wschodnia  bezbronna?,  http://
www.defence24.pl/239188,straz-obrony-osobistej-polska-granica-wschodnia-bezbronna, 
23.07.2015. 
29 Four Lions, film of 2010, Dir. Ch. Morris.
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Conclusion
The text undertakes to analyse the issue of information and anti-
terrorist security of Poland. The two categories of security have been 
discussed with regard to a clash between two spheres – to wit, the state 
and the private sphere. The theoretical foundation for the analysis of the 
conflicting nature of these two spheres is the process of legal qualifica-
tion of legal entities’ conduct with regard to the norm or/and a  set of 
norms, which is referred to with the term of legal modality. In addition, 
the issues of information and anti-terrorist security have been elaborated 
by means of the characterisation of the tasks and operation of the Inter-
nal Security Agency, as well as a synthetic appraisal of a terrorist threat 
to Poland. The starting point for the analysis of the tasks of the Internal 
Security Agency is the notion of “terrorism” and “terrorist offences.” 
Both notions bear their own significance owing to the fact that they are 
used to define the statutory tasks of the Internal Security Agency – “ter-
rorism” in the legally binding Act of 2002, and the “terrorist offences” in 
the Bill on ABW of 2014 (Document No. 2295) to come in force in 2016.
In order to elaborate the said problem, the text addresses two ques-
tions that can be related to the following conclusions:
(1) To what extent does referring to a threat to security influence a  limi-
tation on rights and freedoms in Poland (from the perspective of the 
clash between the state and the private sphere)?
From the viewpoint of a terrorist threat, there are occasional acti-
vities aimed at limiting man’s rights and freedoms. An exception 
is Poland’s spectacular loss of two cases at the European Court of 
Human Rights in 2014; the cases concerned an unlawful detention 
of foreign citizens and a use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
(cases of Husayn/Abu Zubaydah and Al Nashiri). The situation evo-
ked an interesting response from the representatives of the majority 
of political parties, including the left-wing ones, which in the Euro-
pean Union belong to the Party of European Socialists (PES). The 
response was the one of acceptance and positive argumentation for 
the “special means” used while combating terrorism by the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the premises provided by the Polish special 
services.
From the viewpoint of the information security (viewed as special 
powers exercised while performing operational control) one should 
point out that Poland is witnessing a discussion on the number of 
applications for “wire taps,” “itemized phone bills” and other “tele-
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communications data,” submitted by authorized services (e.g. the 
Internal Security Agency). In the case of the ABW, mechanisms of 
abuse are provided by the very regulations concerning the tasks of 
the said service. These were specified in the Act of 2002, and served 
as the basis for an application for operational control. An attempt 
was made at preserving this state in the Bills on ABW of 2013 and 
2014; still, in the Bill of 2014 (Document No. 2295) the legal basis was 
limited. This does not mean that the number of applications for the 
use of technical means for operational control will diminish; note-
worthily, a  former extension of prosecution and court control over 
this type of applications did not decrease, but rather increased the 
number. It must be stressed that, within the scope in question, the 
intended statutory changes with regard to the Act on ABW of 2014 
are only motivated by the Constitutional Tribunal, which disputed 
many of the legal solutions. As regards the access to a special kind 
of information, Poland manifests little motivation in diminishing the 
competence of special services. For that matter, the most frequent 
arguments are the ones concerning the effectiveness of the state’s 
operation in combating organised crime and “terrorist offences” (as 
well as offences employing the latest technology).
(2) To what extent do the tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency 
influence the effectiveness of anti-terrorist security in Poland? 
It must be pointed out that the scope of statutory tasks of the 
Internal Security Agency, defined both in the Act of 2002 and in the 
Bill of 2014 does not positively influence the effectiveness of com-
bating crime against the state and “terrorist offences.” An example 
of the wide scope of the ABW operation is, inter alia, combating 
tax offences (e.g. VAT extortion). The operation scope of the ABW 
places this service in the domain of “criminal intelligence,” which is 
rather debatable given the division of responsibilities between other 
special services in Poland, e.g. the Central Bureau of Investigation, 
the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Treasury Intelligence.
As for the analysis of the problem of information and anti-terro-
rist security of Poland, the text presents only a selection of issues. 
Hence, the analysis of the information-related threats does not 
include such issues as “cyberterrorism” or “cyberespionage,” but 
rather focuses on the problem of a special kind of means used for 
operational control, which is of significance in the context of legal 
modalities, as well as the clash between two spheres – the state and 
the private sphere. As regards the fight undertaken by the Internal 
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Security Agency against terrorism, the issue of the operation of the 
Anti-terrorist Centre (Pol. Centrum Antyterrorystyczne – CAT) within 
this service is not addressed. With regard to the state security, all 
these issues are important enough to merit separate analyses.
ABSTRACT
The subject matter of the analysis conducted in the text is information and anti-
terrorist security of Poland, which has been presented within the context of a clash 
between two spheres – the state and the private sphere. Furthermore, the issues 
of security have been supplemented with a description of the tasks and activity of 
the Internal Security Agency, as well as a synthetic appraisal of a terrorist threat 
to Poland. The main parts of this work are concerned with: (1) the state and the 
private sphere, (2) “terrorism” and terrorist offences, (3) the tasks and activity of 
the Internal Security Agency, (4) an appraisal of a terrorist threat to Poland.
Given the necessity to elaborate the research problem, the text features the 
following research questions: (1) To what extent does referring to a  threat to 
security influence a  limitation on rights and freedoms in Poland (with regard to 
the clash between the state and the private sphere)?, (2) To what extent do the 
tasks and activity of the Internal Security Agency influence the effectiveness of 
anti-terrorist security in Poland?
Remigiusz Rosicki
BEZPIECZEŃSTWO INFORMACJI I ANTYTERRORYSTYCZNE POLSKI. 
KRYTYCZNA ANALIZA NA PRZYKŁADZIE ZADAŃ I DZIAŁAŃ 
AGENCJI BEZPIECZEŃSTWA WEWNĘTRZNEGO
Przedmiotem analizy jest bezpieczeństwo informacji oraz bezpieczeństwo 
antyterrorystyczne Polski. Zagadnienia zostały przedstawione w kontekście kolizji 
dwóch domen – państwowej i prywatnej. Ponadto problematyka bezpieczeństwa 
została uzupełniona przez charakterystykę zadań i działań Agencji Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego oraz syntetyczną ocenę zagrożenia terrorystycznego Polski. Główne 
części pracy dotyczą: (1) Domeny państwowej i domeny prywatnej, (2) „Terroryzmu” 
i  „przestępstw o  charakterze terrorystycznym”, (3) Zadań i  działań Agencji 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, (4) Oceny zagrożenia terrorystycznego Polski. 
W związku z  koniecznością uszczegółowienia problemu badawczego w  artykule 
postawiono następujące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim zakresie powoływanie się 
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na zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa wpływa na ograniczenie praw i wolności w Polsce 
(w ramach kolizji domeny państwowej i prywatnej)?, (2) W jakim zakresie zadania 
i  działania Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego wpływają na efektywność 
bezpieczeństwa antyterrorystycznego w Polsce?
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE:  bezpieczeństwo informacji, bezpieczeństwo antyterrorystyczne, 
Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, kontrwywiad, przestępstwa 
terrorystyczne, modalności prawne 
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